Emancipation

Modifying Age of Emancipation of an Out-of-State Child Support Order.  As mediators and lawyers, we are often confronted with out-of-state divorce judgments.  Since Massachusetts has the most generous emancipation statute in the country, those out-of-state judgments often provide that support ends long before a child’s 23rd birthday, depending on the state.  Steve and Mary Ellen Freddo had four children and were divorced in Florida.  Following the divorce, they both moved to Massachusetts. Mr. Freddo brought a complaint for modification in Massachusetts when all of the children were over eighteen.  Mr. Freddo’s argument was (1) that under Florida law, children are emancipated at age eighteen, with exceptions not relevant here, and the age of emancipation is a non-modifiable matter and (2) under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), if an obligation is non-modifiable in the “issuing state” (Florida, in this case), then the “responding state” (Massachusetts) cannot modify it.  The Probate and Family Court found Mr. Freddo’s complaint frivolous and dismissed it, relying on the “post-eighteen” provisions of G.L. c.208 s.28.  In this significant case of first impression, the Appeals Court reversed, holding that Massachusetts could not modify the age of emancipation where it could not have been modified in Florida.  Acknowledging the inconsistency between G.L. c.208 s.28 and UIFSA, the Appeals Court found that the latter takes priority; both the “full faith and credit purpose” of UIFSA and the fact that it was enacted after G.L. c.208 compel this conclusion.  Freddo v. Freddo, 83 Mass.App.Ct 353 (February 26, 2013)
 
Child Who Becomes Parent Not Emancipated.  An unmarried child does not become emancipated as a matter of law by giving birth, the Appeals Court held in a case of first impression.  The trial court had granted summary judgment for the father, holding that the child was emancipated because “she has a child, receives child support [for him], and has a family of her own.”  The Appeals Court pointed out that there were disputed facts that made such a judgment inappropriate – chief among them, whether the child was a full-time student and whether the child was still principally dependent on her mother for support. In other words: for questions about emancipation, look to the statute, G.L. c.208 §28.  LaBrecque v. Parsons, 74 Mass.App.Ct. 766 (August 4, 2009)
 
Emancipation: Interplay Between Statute and Judgment.  In a case examining the interplay between emancipation language in an agreement and that of G.L. c. 208 s. 28, the 19-year-old son of a divorced couple enrolled in college and moved in with his uncle who lived near the college.  After the move, the parties entered into a modification agreement which was incorporated in a judgment where the father agreed to pay a reduced amount of support to the mother and some money to the uncle.  The father subsequently failed to pay that amount and the mother filed a complaint for contempt.  The father was found in contempt and appealed.  In the appeal, he argued that the modification judgment was void because it violated the emancipation language in G.L. c. 208 s. 28 requiring that the child be domiciled with a parent, among other reasons.  The Appeals Court affirmed the finding of contempt, holding that the stipulation he entered into was enforceable.  G.L. c. 208 s. 28, the appellate court made clear, is not relevant here.  The statute provides boundaries for a judge making a decision after a trial but, in this case, the stipulation – not the statute – was the relevant text.   Barnes v. Devlin, 84 Mass.App.Ct. 159 (August 13, 2013)